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CRIMINAL LAW-ALIBI-APPLICATION OF SECTION 295 (L) OF
THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE TO DEFENDANT'S TESTIxONY.-

• The defendants had been convicted of burglary in the third degree 1 in
the County Court of Chemung County. Their appeal is based on two
counts: that Section 295 (L) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 2 is
unconstitutional; that, even if the statute is constitutional, there is
reversible error in the lower court's denial of a motion, to dismiss after
refusing permission to defendant, Charles Shambrook, to offer testimony as to his and' his co-defendant's whereabouts at the time the
crime was committed. The refusal was based on defendant's failure
to file a bill of particulars in accordance with the provisions of Section
295 (L) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, after demand for such by
the prosecuting attorney. Held, judgment reversed, and new trial
,ordered. Exclusion of defendant's testimony as to his whereabouts at
the time of the crime is reversible error as being prejudicial and de"
priving defendant of his right to a fair trial.3 Section 295 (L) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to defendant's testimony.
People v. Rakiec, 260 App. Div. 452, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 607 (3d Dept.
1940).
Section 295 (L) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is constitutional. 4 At common law a party to an action was not a competent
I

'N. Y. PiNAL LAW § 404 (The breaking and entering of a building with
intent to commit a crime therein; or the breaking out. from a building after
having committed a crime therein, although the entry was accomplished without
breaking in is burglary in the, third degree. The punishment for burglary in
the third degree is imprisonment for not more than ten years).
2 N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 295(L) (In all cases where a defendant has
been indicted by a grand jury, the prosecuting officer may, not less than eight
days before the case is moved for trial, serve upon such defendant or his counsel
and file a demand which shall require that if such defendant intend to offer; for
any purpose whatever, testimony which may tend to establish his presence elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he must
within four days thereafter serve upon such prosecuting officer and file a bill of
particulars which shall set forth in detail the place or places where the defendant
claims to have been, together with the names, post-office addresses, residences
and places of employment of the witnesses upon whom he intends to rely to
establish his presence elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. Unless the defendant shall, pursuant to such demand, serve and
file such a bill of particulars, the court, in the event that such testimony is sought
to be interposed by the defendant upon the trial for any purpose whatever, or in
the event that a witness not mentioned in such bill of particulars is called by
the defendant to give such testimony, may exclude such testimony or the testimony of such witness. In the event that the court shall allow such testimony,
or the testimony of such witness, it must upon motion of the prosecuting officer,
grant an adjournment not to exceed three days).
3 "A fair trial is a legal trial conducted according to the rules of common
law except in so far as it has been changed by statute and one wherein legal
rights of the accused are safeguarded and respected." Universal Adjustment
Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152 (1933) ; Johnson v.
City of Wildwood, 116 N. J. L. 462, 184 AtI. 616 (1936).
4 People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N. Y. Supp. 612 (1936). In other
states having similar statutes, they have been held constitutional. People v.
Wudauki, 253 Mich. 83, 234 N. W. 157 (1931) ; People v. Marcus, 253 Mich.
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witness at the trial.5 In conjunction with this, one accused of a crime
was incompetent to testify in his own behalf, on the theory that he
would swear falsely.6 The foregoing rule has been changed by statute.7 At trial, in the instant case, the defendant was deprived of his
right to testify in his own behalf on the ground of noncompliance with
Section 295(L) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Before 1935,
the defense could interpose witnesses, without notice, to prove that the
accused was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission
and thus create a reasonable doubt as to the verity of the testimony of
the state's witnesses.8 The purpose of the "alibi 9 statute" was to
prevent such practice.' 0 But it does not abrogate the defendant's
right to testify as to his whereabouts at the time covered by the indict12
ment." A defendant in a criminal action is entitled to a fair trial.
Section 295 (L) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not compel
the defendant to incriminate himself or give information to the district
attorney unless defendant voluntarily and for his own benefit intends
to use alibi witnesses.' 3 If the defendant is required to divulge his
own testimony beforehand, the advantage given to the prosecutor
would be so great that the defendant would most certainly be deprived
of his right to a fair trial.1 4 Where a defendant is deprived of his
right to testify in his own behalf he is not accorded a fair trial.' 5 When
a defendant enters a plea of not guilty and his attorney ignores the
district attorney's demand for a bill of particulars pursuant to statute,
refusal to allow defendant to testify as to his whereabouts on the night
of the crime, denied him his legal right to testify in his own behalf.' 6
410, 235 N. W. 202 (1931); State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N. E. 656
(1931).
5 Le Blanc v. Yawn, 99 Fla. 328, 126 So. 789 (1930) ; Haswell v. Walker,
117 Me. 427, 104 Atl. 810 (1918).
6 State v. Wilcox, 206 N. C. 691, 175 S. E. 122 (1934).
7N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc.

§ 393

(the defendant in all cases may testify

as a witness in his own behalf). Similar statutes have been enacted in all
states.
8 Witt v. State, 205 Ind. 499, 185 N. E. 645 (1933).
9 In Tomlinson v. United States, 93 F. (2d) 652 (App. D. C. 1937) and
State v. Grant, 98 S. W. (2d) 761 (Mo. 1936), it was held "alibi" meant that
defendant claims he was in another and different place than the place in which
the alleged crime was committed, at the time such crime was committed.
20 People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N. Y. Supp. 612 (1936).
"1 State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N. E. 656 (1931).
12 People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 258 Pac. 607 (1927); Petro v. State,
201 Ind. 401, 184 N. E. 710 (1933); Fitzsimmons v. State, 116 Neb. 440, 218
N. W. 83 (1928) ; State v. Heator, 149 Wash. 452, 271 Pac. 89 (1928).
'13 People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212, 292 N. Y. Supp. 612 (1936).
'4 People v. Cosmos, 205 N. Y. 91, 98 N. E. 408 (1912).
's People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253, 50 N. E. 846 (1898); People v.
Mantin, 184 App. Div. 767, 172 N. Y. Supp. 371 (1st Dept. 1918); People v.
Wujanik, 239 App. Div. 764, 264 N. Y. Supp. 906 (4th Dept. 1933) ; People v.
Rosenzweig, 135 Misc. 324, 239 N. Y. Supp. 358 (1929).
2, State v. Nook, 123 Ohio St. 190, 174 N. E. 743 (1930) ; State v. Thayer,
124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N. E. 656 (1931). In a prosecution for burglary and
larceny, testimony of defendant as to his whereabouts, introduced for the purpose of impeaching the state's witness, was admissible without notice before
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Section 295(L) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to
the testimony of a defendant but only to the testimony of other witnesses produced
for the purpose of giving evidence upon the question
17
of an alibi.
A.M.

CRIMINAL LAw-LorrE E.-In 1931 a combination was
formed to gain control of and operate the various "policy" enterprises.
The appellant was taken into the combination for the purpose of
affording its members and operators protection from arrest, and if
arrested, immunity from conviction by using his political influence.
Appellant was found guilty by the jury and convicted on thirteen
counts in the court below. The first count charged a conspiracy to
contrive, propose and conduct lotteries known as "policy" ' and "the
numbers game", and the remaining twelve counts charged twelve separate substantive crimes; each of which consisted of participating in,
contriving, proposing or drawing a lottery. His conviction was
unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division.2 On appeal, appellant contends: that the game of "'policy" does not constitute a
"lottery"; and that, consequently, the offenses of which he stands
convicted, because they relate to "policy", are not punishable under
provisions of the Penal Law on lotteries. 3 Appellant also contends
that the conspiracy count in the indictment should be dismissed for
insufficiency on the face thereof, because it fails to allege an overt act 4
committed within two years, the applicable period of, limitations,5 for
the crime of conspiracy is a misdemeanor. 6 Held, conviction affirmed
on the twelve counts of taking part in contriving, proposing or conducting a lottery, but modified so as to dismiss the count. for conspirtrial as to alibi, and the exclusion of such testimony was prejudicial. Reed v.
State, 4 Ohio App. 318, 185 N. E. 558 (1933).
17 State v. Nook, 123 Ohio St. 190, 174 N. E. 743 (1930); State v. Thayer,
124 Ohio St. 1, 176 N. E. 656 (1931).
1 "Policy" is a game of chance in which a player selects a number containing
three figures. That number is written on a slip of paper which is given with
the amount bet to a so-called collector. The winning number is determined by
chance by a computation based on the moneys paid on the result of horse races

at a designated track. Winners are paid six hundred times the amount of
the bet

2258 App. Div. 466, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 141 (1st Dept 1940).
3 N. Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1370-1372. Appellant was convicted under § 1372
which provides: "A person who contrives, proposes or draws a lottery, or assists
in contriving, proposing or drawing the same, is punishable by imprisonment for
not more than two years, or by fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or
both."
4 N.

Y. PENAL LAW § 583.
5N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 142.
6N. Y. PENAL LAW § 580.

